How do I install Mcp Server (OMCHOKSI108)?

You can install Mcp Server (OMCHOKSI108) using git. Visit the official repository for exact commands and configuration.

What is Mcp Server (OMCHOKSI108) best used for?

Mcp Server (OMCHOKSI108) is best for Git & Version Control.

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01SKILLGIT & VERSION CONTROL / MCP SERVER (OMCHOKSI108)

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Mcp Server (OMCHOKSI108)

by OMCHOKSI108Updated 4 months ago

“This repository contains Model Context Protocol (MCP) server implementations that demonstrate how to create and integrate custom tools and data sources with AI applications. MCP is an open-source standard that enables AI applications like Claude or ChatGPT to connect to external systems, data sources, and tools in a standardized way.”— OMCHOKSI108

npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-mcp-server-(omchoksi108)

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02VERDICTHOW IT RATED

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03SECURITYWHAT WE CHECKED

Security flags foundOur static scan found signals worth reviewing before you trust this with an agent. See exactly what, per check, below.

Telemetry disclosureUndisclosed egress detected.Static checks found network calls the docs do not mention. Disclosed telemetry is common and fine, silent telemetry is the finding.

Security tierTier 1, Contained.No network access and no credentials. Runs entirely on its own. What tiers mean

Install-time hooks & dependenciesno flags

Code that runs when you install it, before you ever call a tool.

Runs code / shell commands12 findings

MEDIUMMCP_5/main.py:80 — Code-execution surface: a subprocess spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMMCP_3/frontend/src/components/Dashboard.tsx:410 — Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMMCP_3/frontend/src/components/Dashboard.tsx:452 — Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMMCP_3/backend/routes/mcp.js:2 — Code-execution surface: a node child_process call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMMCP_3/backend/routes/mcp.js:82 — Code-execution surface: a node child_process call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMMCP_3/backend/routes/mcp.js:83 — Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

+ 6 more in this check

Secrets & credentials14 findings

HIGHMCP_3/backend/server.js:100 — A secret-shaped env var appears on the same line as a log/print sink: a credential may be written to logs or stdout, where it can leak.

INFOMCP_2/llm_service.py:10 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOMCP_2/llm_service.py:22 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOMCP_3/backend/server.js:43 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOMCP_3/backend/routes/auth.js:16 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOMCP_3/backend/routes/auth.js:53 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

+ 8 more in this check

Network calls out8 findings

MEDIUMMCP_2/scripts/debug_gemini.py:8 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'generativelanguage.googleapis.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMMCP_2/scripts/test_full_stack.py:30 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'test.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMMCP_3/frontend/vite.config.js:4 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'vite.dev'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMMCP_3/frontend/vite.config.ts:4 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'vitejs.dev'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMMCP_3/frontend/src/components/Icons.tsx:4 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'www.w3.org'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMMCP_3/backend/setup.js:25 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'makersuite.google.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

+ 2 more in this check

Prompt-injection passthrough1 finding

INFOMCP_3/mcp-fastapi/app/mcp_server.py — HEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.

Permission scope breadthno flags

How much access it asks for versus what its job needs.

How to read this: these are static checks over the source at a point in time. They catch the patterns above, not everything. Absence of a flag is not absence of danger, and a tool that runs cleanly can still behave differently once installed. We do not call any tool simply "safe". Runtime-behavior checks are the next layer we are adding.

04RELATEDWORKS ALONGSIDE THIS

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