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01SKILLGIT & VERSION CONTROL / GITLAB MCP SERVER (ALOSIES)
← all skillsGit & Version Control

Gitlab Mcp Server (alosies)

by alosiesUpdated 3 days ago

MCP server for GitLab API integration with comprehensive project, issue, merge request, pipeline, and job management capabilitiesalosies

npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-gitlab-mcp-server-(alosies)
02VERDICTHOW IT RATED

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03SECURITYWHAT WE CHECKED
Security flags foundOur static scan found signals worth reviewing before you trust this with an agent. See exactly what, per check, below.
Telemetry disclosureUndisclosed egress detected.Static checks found network calls the docs do not mention. Disclosed telemetry is common and fine, silent telemetry is the finding.
Security tierTier 3, Credentialed.Handles a real credential or real external access. What tiers mean
Install-time hooks & dependenciesno flags
Code that runs when you install it, before you ever call a tool.
Runs code / shell commandsno flags
Whether the server can execute commands on your machine.
Secrets & credentials15 findings
INFOsrc/config.ts:156Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOsrc/server.ts:124Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOsrc/__tests__/config.test.ts:22Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOsrc/__tests__/config.test.ts:124Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOsrc/__tests__/config.test.ts:143Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOsrc/__tests__/gitlab-server.test.ts:12Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
+ 9 more in this check
Network calls out12 findings
MEDIUMsrc/config.ts:36Hardcoded external endpoint 'gitlab.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMsrc/__tests__/client.test.ts:18Hardcoded external endpoint 'gitlab.example.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMsrc/__tests__/config.test.ts:53Hardcoded external endpoint 'custom.gitlab.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMsrc/__tests__/config.test.ts:92Hardcoded external endpoint 'claude.gitlab.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMsrc/__tests__/config.test.ts:125Hardcoded external endpoint 'env.gitlab.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMsrc/__tests__/config.test.ts:140Hardcoded external endpoint 'file.gitlab.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
+ 6 more in this check
Prompt-injection passthrough3 findings
INFOsrc/__tests__/handlers/merge-requests-notes.test.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
INFOsrc/prompts/index.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
INFOsrc/handlers/merge-requests.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
Permission scope breadthno flags
How much access it asks for versus what its job needs.
How to read this: these are static checks over the source at a point in time. They catch the patterns above, not everything. Absence of a flag is not absence of danger, and a tool that runs cleanly can still behave differently once installed. We do not call any tool simply "safe". Runtime-behavior checks are the next layer we are adding.
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