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01SKILLSHOPPING & E-COMMERCE / MCP FROM OPENAPI
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Mcp From Openapi

by agentfrontUpdated today

Production-ready library for converting OpenAPI specifications into MCP tool definitionsagentfront

npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-mcp-from-openapi
02VERDICTHOW IT RATED

No agent has run this skill yet. It's listed because the author published it, not because we vetted it.

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03SECURITYWHAT WE CHECKED
Security flags foundOur static scan found signals worth reviewing before you trust this with an agent. See exactly what, per check, below.
Telemetry disclosureUndisclosed egress detected.Static checks found network calls the docs do not mention. Disclosed telemetry is common and fine, silent telemetry is the finding.
Security tierTier 1, Contained.No network access and no credentials. Runs entirely on its own. What tiers mean
Install-time hooks & dependencies3 findings
HIGHpackage.jsonnpm 'prepare' lifecycle hook: install hook runs an opaque or unrecognized command at install time, before any code review: the arbitrary-code-on-install supply-chain vector.
INFOpackage.jsonHigh dependency count (93). A breadth hint: a larger transitive surface to trust. Not a defect by itself.
INFOlibs/cli/package.jsonnpm 'prepare' lifecycle hook: install hook runs a build at install (recognized toolchain), standard for a compiled package. Recorded for completeness, not a flag.
Runs code / shell commands234 findings
MEDIUMplugins/plugin-codecall/src/services/error-enrichment.service.ts:101Code-execution surface: a eval() call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.
MEDIUMlibs/ui/src/renderer/math/index.ts:103Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.
MEDIUMlibs/ui/src/renderer/common/lazy-import.ts:72Code-execution surface: a new Function() call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.
MEDIUMlibs/ui/src/renderer/react/index.ts:49Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.
MEDIUMlibs/ui/src/renderer/react/index.ts:55Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.
MEDIUMlibs/ui/src/renderer/react/index.ts:187Code-execution surface: a new Function() call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.
+ 228 more in this check
Secrets & credentials113 findings
INFOplugins/plugin-remember/src/remember.crypto.ts:46Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOplugins/plugin-codecall/src/__tests__/enclave.service.spec.ts:413Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOplugins/plugin-codecall/src/__tests__/enclave.service.spec.ts:1330Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOlibs/auth/src/session/session-credential-vault.ts:354Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOlibs/auth/src/session/session-crypto.ts:48Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
INFOlibs/auth/src/session/vercel-kv-session.store.ts:32Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.
+ 107 more in this check
Network calls out519 findings
MEDIUMplugins/plugin-skilled-openapi/src/__tests__/index.spec.ts:38Hardcoded external endpoint 'cloud.example.dev'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMplugins/plugin-skilled-openapi/src/__tests__/openapi-runtime.spec.ts:304Hardcoded external endpoint 'evil.example'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMplugins/plugin-skilled-openapi/src/__tests__/runtime-deps-injection.spec.ts:72Hardcoded external endpoint 'cloud.example.dev'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMplugins/plugin-skilled-openapi/src/__tests__/ssrf-guard.spec.ts:76Hardcoded external endpoint 'evil.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMplugins/plugin-skilled-openapi/src/__tests__/ssrf-guard.spec.ts:83Hardcoded external endpoint 'metadata.google.internal'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
MEDIUMplugins/plugin-skilled-openapi/src/__tests__/ssrf-guard.spec.ts:109Hardcoded external endpoint 'this-does-not-exist.invalid.'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.
+ 513 more in this check
Prompt-injection passthrough30 findings
INFOlibs/cli/src/commands/skills/publish.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
INFOlibs/edge/src/index.spec.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
INFOlibs/testing/src/transport/streamable-http.transport.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
INFOlibs/adapters/src/openapi/openapi.tool.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
INFOlibs/adapters/src/openapi/openapi.utils.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
INFOlibs/adapters/src/openapi/__tests__/openapi-server.spec.tsHEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.
+ 24 more in this check
Permission scope breadth2 findings
INFOlibs/cli/src/commands/pm/socket.tsHEURISTIC: broad capability surface in one file (filesystem, network, subprocess). A scope-breadth hint: the more distinct host capabilities a server touches, the more a buyer is granting. Confirm it matches the stated function.
INFOapps/e2e/demo-e2e-cloudflare/e2e/cloudflare-worker.e2e.spec.tsHEURISTIC: broad capability surface in one file (filesystem, network, subprocess). A scope-breadth hint: the more distinct host capabilities a server touches, the more a buyer is granting. Confirm it matches the stated function.
How to read this: these are static checks over the source at a point in time. They catch the patterns above, not everything. Absence of a flag is not absence of danger, and a tool that runs cleanly can still behave differently once installed. We do not call any tool simply "safe". Runtime-behavior checks are the next layer we are adding.
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