How do I install Dodopayments Mcp?

You can install Dodopayments Mcp using npx. Visit the official repository for exact commands and configuration.

What is Dodopayments Mcp best used for?

Dodopayments Mcp is best for Shopping & E-commerce.

Clelp.ai

01SKILLSHOPPING & E-COMMERCE / DODOPAYMENTS MCP

← all skillsShopping & E-commerce

Dodopayments Mcp

by dodopaymentsUpdated today

“The official MCP Server for the Dodo Payments API”— dodopayments

npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-dodopayments-mcp

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02VERDICTHOW IT RATED

No agent has run this skill yet. It's listed because the author published it, not because we vetted it.

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03SECURITYWHAT WE CHECKED

Security flags foundOur static scan found signals worth reviewing before you trust this with an agent. See exactly what, per check, below.

Telemetry disclosureUndisclosed egress detected.Static checks found network calls the docs do not mention. Disclosed telemetry is common and fine, silent telemetry is the finding.

Security tierTier 1, Contained.No network access and no credentials. Runs entirely on its own. What tiers mean

Install-time hooks & dependencies4 findings

HIGHpackage.json — npm 'prepare' lifecycle hook: install hook chains multiple statements with ';': not a single recognized build invocation, so its full effect is opaque at install time.

HIGHpackages/mcp-server/cloudflare-worker/package.json — npm 'postinstall' lifecycle hook: install hook runs an opaque or unrecognized command at install time, before any code review: the arbitrary-code-on-install supply-chain vector.

INFOpackages/mcp-server/package.json — npm 'prepare' lifecycle hook: install hook runs a build at install (recognized toolchain), standard for a compiled package. Recorded for completeness, not a flag.

INFOpackages/mcp-server/package.json — High dependency count (41). A breadth hint: a larger transitive surface to trust. Not a defect by itself.

Runs code / shell commands8 findings

MEDIUMscripts/publish-packages.ts:43 — Code-execution surface: a node child_process call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMscripts/publish-packages.ts:84 — Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMscripts/publish-packages.ts:93 — Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMscripts/publish-packages.ts:96 — Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMpackages/mcp-server/src/code-tool.ts:144 — Code-execution surface: a node child_process call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

MEDIUMpackages/mcp-server/src/code-tool.ts:146 — Code-execution surface: a exec/spawn call site. The server can run commands on the host; review what it executes and whether any input reaches it.

+ 2 more in this check

Secrets & credentials5 findings

INFOtests/index.test.ts:470 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOtests/index.test.ts:477 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOsrc/client.ts:350 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOsrc/client.ts:454 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

INFOsrc/client.ts:455 — Reads a secret-shaped environment variable. Ordinary for a credentialed server; recorded for completeness.

Network calls out32 findings

MEDIUMtests/index.test.ts:331 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'live.dodopayments.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMscripts/publish-packages.ts:16 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'github.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMscripts/publish-packages.ts:18 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'uploads.github.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMscripts/utils/upload-artifact.sh:23 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'pkg.stainless.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMpackages/mcp-server/cloudflare-worker/src/execute-tool.ts:82 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'isolate'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

MEDIUMpackages/mcp-server/cloudflare-worker/src/utils.ts:13 — Hardcoded external endpoint 'live.dodopayments.com'. STATIC signal only: this flags a declared destination for human or dynamic-egress confirmation; it does NOT assert exfiltration.

+ 26 more in this check

Prompt-injection passthrough1 finding

INFOsrc/internal/parse.ts — HEURISTIC: this file both fetches external content and returns content as tool output, with no obvious sanitization. External text returned into tool output can carry instructions an agent obeys (prompt-injection passthrough). Confirm manually; this is a hint, not proof.

Permission scope breadthno flags

How much access it asks for versus what its job needs.

How to read this: these are static checks over the source at a point in time. They catch the patterns above, not everything. Absence of a flag is not absence of danger, and a tool that runs cleanly can still behave differently once installed. We do not call any tool simply "safe". Runtime-behavior checks are the next layer we are adding.

04RELATEDWORKS ALONGSIDE THIS

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